The Nuclear Programme

The bomb is the defence seat's biggest project: a small technology tree that turns defence appropriations into a warhead stockpile and, eventually, into a deterrent the whole world has to reckon with. This page covers how you get in, how you climb, what it costs, and what it does to the world when you do.

Who can open a programme

Three gates stand between a country and its first device, and all three must be open:

1. The capable set. In the founding cold-war era, only the United States, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom can open a nuclear programme. Other countries do not have the industrial and scientific base, whatever their budget says.
2. The Nuclear Delivery doctrine node. Your conventional National Doctrine tree must have adopted Nuclear Delivery. That node used to be a dead end; now it is the door.
3. The Cold War subsystem toggle. Administrators can switch the cold-war layer off for a world. With it off, the programme surfaces do not appear.

Entry runs through the defence cabinet seat. If you do not hold the defence portfolio, you are lobbying whoever does.

The device ladder

Device nodes are the physics. Each one is adopted only by conducting a nuclear test, and a test is a world event: everyone sees it, tension rises, and your deterrence posture shocks upward. There is no such thing as quietly acquiring the hydrogen bomb.

Each tier requires the one before it, MIRV additionally requires an ICBM force, and no node can be pursued before its year. The production cap is the ladder's real prize: your device tier is the ceiling on how many warheads the weapons complex can assemble per turn.

Delivery legs

Delivery nodes adopt quietly, like ordinary doctrine: no test, no spectacle. They are what make the stockpile mean something.

A stockpile with no delivery leg deters nobody. Deterrence credibility is scored from your warhead count discounted by how survivable your delivery posture is: one leg is a threat that can be disarmed on the ground; all four is a promise. The submarine leg is the classic second strike, the reason an enemy cannot win by shooting first.

Building warheads

Once you have a device tier, you set a production rate: warheads ordered per turn, clamped to your tier's cap. Each warhead is paid for out of the defence appropriation at a unit cost that falls as your device tier matures: $800 apiece at the fission tier, down toward $350 at the MIRV tier. If the defence budget cannot cover the order, the complex builds what the money allows and no more.

Everything here rides the defence budget: test costs, node costs, and the per-warhead bill all draw on the same appropriation that pays for conventional procurement. A finance minister who starves defence is, among other things, capping the arsenal.

What a test does to the world

A nuclear test is not a private milestone. When the device goes off:

• Cold-war tension spikes. The bigger the device, the bigger the jump. The whole world feels it, including your allies.
• The news carries it. The test appears in the world's recent developments; there is no concealing that it happened or who conducted it.
• Your deterrence posture jumps. Rivals' planners now price you differently.

Time your tests. A thermonuclear shot in the middle of an active crisis is pouring petrol on a fire you may not control.

Covert programmes

Some states may pursue a bomb in secret, outside the public ladder above. Understand what that road looks like before you romanticize it: a covert programme is slow, it is expensive, and every turn it runs it risks exposure. A programme dragged into the light invites a superpower crackdown, and the political price of being caught cheating is paid on top of everything already spent. The exact odds of discovery are not published, and will not be. If you go looking for them, you have already misunderstood the bet.

See also: Cold War Tension, National Doctrine, Defence Procurement, Conflicts & the Military System.